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Abstract. It is commonly claimed that the initial stages of any startup business 
are dominated by continuous, extended uncertainty, in an environment that has 
even been described as chaotic. Consequently, decisions are made in uncertain 
circumstances, so making the right decision is crucial to successful business. 
However, little currently exists in the way of empirical studies into this supposed 
uncertainty. In this paper, we study decision-making in early-stage software 
startups by means of a single, in-depth case study. Based on our data, we argue 
that software startups do not work in a chaotic environment, nor are they charac-
terized by unique uncertainty unlike that experienced by other firms. 
Keywords: Software Startups, Entrepreneurship, Decision-making, Cynefin 
Framework, In-Depth Case Study. 
1 Introduction 
Despite being extensively studied [10], startups still lack an accurate definition. Various 
characteristics have been attributed to startups to differentiate them from other firms. 
Characteristics typically associated with startups include (1) highly reactive, (2) inno-
vation, (3) uncertainty, (4) rapidly evolving, (5) time-pressure, (6) third party depend-
ency, (7) small team, (9) one product), (10) low-experienced team, (11) new company, 
(12) flat organization, (13) highly risky, (14) not self-sustained, (15) lack of resources, 
and (16) little working history [8]. In software startups, the role of software in the final 
offering may vary from being the core product to merely serving as an enabler or sup-
port of the main business idea (e.g. Uber) [11]. 
Klotins [3] highlighted the (lack of) empirical evidence behind many of these char-
acteristics, questioning the uniqueness of software startups in relation to failure rates, 
lack of software engineering (SE) experience, innovativeness, market-related time pres-
sure, and lack of resources. To this end, decision-making is another area where little is 
known empirically about software startups [10]. Software startups are considered to 
work amidst uncertainty that has even been described as a chaotic [2, 7, 8]. 
To provide empirical evidence into this on-going debate on software startup charac-
teristics, we study software startup decision-making in relation to the uncertainty at-
tributed to software startup in this paper. We do so by means of an in-depth case study 
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executed in an ethnography-inspired fashion, utilizing the Cynefin framework [6] for 
data analysis. Specifically, we tackle the following research question in this paper:  
RQ: Using the Cynefin framework, how can we characterize the context software 
startups operate in in relation to decision-making? 
2 Background 
Few studies focusing on decision-making in the context of software startups currently 
exist [10]. On the other hand, organizational decision-making is a well-established area 
of research spanning various disciplines from economic ones to psychology and SE. 
Areas of research related to it are similarly diverse (e.g., business intelligence). 
Some of the research on decision-making in the area of New Product Development 
(NPD) can be considered related to this context. Software startups search for new busi-
ness models [10], whereas conventional business organizations execute business mod-
els. Software startups also make various decisions regarding SE [8]. 
In a literature review spanning multiple disciplines, Krisnan and Ulrich [5] presented 
a list of decisions related to setting up a product development project. They list various 
higher-level decisions related to product development that an organization needs to 
make when starting a product development project. Many of these decisions (e.g., 
"which technologies will be employed in the product(s)?") are relevant for software 
startups, while some are far more relevant to more established companies, (e.g., "will a 
functional, project, or development matrix organization be used?"). 
Extant literature has focused on conventional firms. The argument used to justify 
studies into software startups is that they differ from conventional firms, making the 
findings of such studies not (fully) applicable to them. Thus, studies seeking to under-
stand how and whether startups differ from conventional firms are useful in this area. 
3 Research Framework: Cynefin 
To analyze our data, we utilize an existing theory: the Cynefin framework. Cynefin (Fig 
1) is a decision-making tool from the field of knowledge management and complexity 
science [6]. It a sense-making tool intended to help its users understand the current 
context they are in. It presents a typology for decision-making situations. 
The Cynefin framework splits decisions into five domains. The domains are based 
on the assumption of order, i.e., perceived causality of cause and effect. Each domain 
contains characteristics describing decisions in that domain, recommended actions for 
decision-making in that domain, and what type of practices should be used in it. 
For example, the chaotic domain is characterized by a lack of perceivable cause and 
effect relations, as well as time pressure. The recommended actions are act, sense, and 
respond. I.e., one has to act quickly in order to establish some facts (sense) after which 
one has to respond to the situation again. This continues iteratively until it is possible 
to exit the chaotic domain. Crisis management situations are typical examples of chaos. 
In addition to the four main domains, disorder refers to a situation where the domain is 
unclear, necessitating further analysis of the situation. 
3 
 
 
Fig. 1. The Cynefin Framework [6] 
4 Research Methodology and Case Description 
This study was carried out as a single in-depth case study, in an ethnography-inspired 
fashion. One of the authors worked as the founder of a software startup while collecting 
data. The case startup (from here on out Startup A) was founded in early 2018 by an 
inexperienced founder. Startup A produces a software service via a dedicated hardware 
solution: a wristband that would act as a replacement for business cards. Initially, it was 
unclear whether the company would develop only the software, or the hardware as well. 
The case startup is a real-life startup not founded to carry out this study. 
The data collection started when the founder was the sole member of the team and 
the startup only had an idea to its name. Data from the case was collected from 30 April 
to 30 October 2018, in the form of video diary entries. Each evening, the founder pro-
duced a video recording detailing each decision they had made that day, or since the 
previous entry, along with detailing the current situation of Startup A. Occasionally, 
entries were produced less regularly, either because no decisions were made, or because 
the founder was not working on the startup e.g. during a weekend.  
The recordings were later transcribed for analysis. These transcripts included a full 
transcript of each entry and a list of every decision discussed in each entry. From the 
transcripts, all decisions (136 total) were extracted into a list, which was then analyzed 
using the Cynefin framework (section 3). Each decision was evaluated and placed into 
the corresponding domain according to the criteria described in Table 1.  
In order to increase the rigor of the analysis, we followed the protocol below: 
1. Author A (founder) categorizes the data and provides reasoning for each choice. 
2. Author B categorizes the data independently, without seeing A’s analysis. 
3. Author B compares the results of their analysis with those of Author A. 
4. Decisions classified into the same category by Authors A and B are included for 
analysis (89 decisions, 65,4% of the total 136). 
5. Author B studies the reasoning provided by Author A in the case of conflicting 
classifications (47 decisions, 34,6% of the total 136), and either changes their 
classifications by agreeing with Author A or continues to disagree. 
6. Author C discusses the remaining conflicts with B (22. 16,2% of 136 total). 
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7. Remaining conflicts are classified based on the consensus of Authors B and C 
Table 1. Criteria for Assigning Decisions into the Cynefin Main Domains. 
 Decision 
speed 
Effects  
observable 
Potential  
decisions 
Key action 
Simple Fast 
Immediately 
or quickly 
Usually one correct one Categorize 
Complicated Slow 
Quickly or 
slight delay 
Multiple potentially 
correct ones 
Analyze 
Complex 
(Very) 
Slow 
Slowly 
Numerous, difficult to 
choose good ones 
Experiment 
Chaotic Fast 
Immediately 
or quickly 
No correct option, 
minimize risks 
Act 
5 Results 
This section is split into five subsections according to the Cynefin domains. In our anal-
ysis, we highlight key observations in the form of Primary Empirical Conclusions 
(PEC), which we then discuss in the discussion section. Each subsection contains some 
examples of decisions and the full list of decisions is on FigShare1. 
5.1 Simple Domain 
Out of 136 decisions, 36 were simple. Indeed, an early-stage startup faces many tasks 
that can be considered universal for small firms, such as setting up a company website 
and social media profiles, as well as creating a logo. A new firm, startup or not, has to 
carry out a large number of menial tasks. 
Aside from such decisions relevant for virtually any startup, Startup A also made 
various context-specific simple decisions. These included setting up meetings with or-
ganizations belonging to the local startup ecosystem, dressing up for said meetings, and 
creating a calendar for the team in order to keep track of events.  
However, many simple decisions led to further decisions that were complicated or 
even complex in nature. The decision to set up a website is simple because it is a best 
practice but deciding on what content to put on the website requires analysis. 
5.2 Complicated Domain 
Out of 136 decisions, 46 were complicated. These complicated decisions required ca-
pabilities from different areas of business and IT. For an early-stage startup with a small 
team, finding the required capabilities can be challenging, as was the case here. The 
inexperience of Startup A’s team made many of the complicated decisions more 
 
1 https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.8298008.v1. 
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resource intensive. E.g., the team did not know how to find a limited company and thus 
had to devote resources towards studying how to.  
PEC1: Inexperience increases the workload of a software startup team, contributing 
to the lack of resources typically associated with software startups 
Indeed, many of the complicated decisions were related to resource allocation. The 
team constantly weighed between different funding options, trying to analyze which 
ones were the most likely to yield funding if applied for. As funding applications re-
quired time to prepare, this further aggravated the lack of resources.  
PEC2: A lack of financial resources contributes towards a lack of resources in terms 
of person-hours. 
Startup A was able to tackle some of the complicated issues with the capabilities 
they had. However, they occasionally had to learn new skills (designing), enlist outside 
help (video making), or hire new team members (programming). Issues related to team 
capabilities were prominent in Startup A in the complex and complicated domains. 
5.3 Complex Domain 
Out of 136 decisions, only 21 were complex (15,4%). Complex decisions require ex-
perimentation and cannot be consistently solved with existing good or best practices. 
PEC3: Only a small portion of the decisions (very) early stage software startups 
make requires experimentation over analytical decision-making based on existing good 
or best practices 
Many complex decisions made by Startup A were related to funding. Startup A was 
constantly balancing between different funding options with no clear way to determine 
the most likely successful one. The team was eventually forced to pursue funding op-
tions that would have yielded funding the fastest. Some of the sources of funding also 
had conflicting requirements (e.g. requiring a limited company (to not exist yet)). 
PEC4: A lack of financial resources notably increases the level of uncertainty expe-
rienced by a software startup 
Aside from funding, Startup A operated in a complex environment in relation to their 
service. Lacking hardware capabilities, they struggled to devise a technical MVP. With 
no technical MVP, they were forced to experiment with other ways of validation (e.g. 
surveys), and with no funding, they found it hard to experiment with existing hardware. 
PEC5: A lack of technical know-how in the team is a critical issue for software 
startups and increases the uncertainty experienced by a software startup 
5.4 Chaotic Domain 
No decisions were categorized as chaotic. Startup A never experienced time pressure 
that necessitated acting without experimentation or analysis. Though they struggled 
with funding, they had never paid themselves salaries and thus it was simply their nor-
mal situation. It is, nonetheless, arguably possible for a software startup to find itself in 
a chaotic situation in relation to funding e.g. upon failing to pay salaries. 
PEC6: Software startups do not operate in a predominantly chaotic environment 
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5.5 Disorder 
Disorder is highly context-specific and difficult to identify retrospectively. Only some 
personal time management decisions of the founder were classified under disorder (e.g. 
whether to work weekends). Unforeseen events, fatigue, and one’s own mood can affect 
such decisions, making it difficult to decide in advance what to do on such a high level. 
6 Discussion 
We have underlined our Primary Empirical Conclusions (PEC) in Table 5. In this sec-
tion, we discuss each of them in relation to extant literature. 
Table 5. Primary Empirical Conclusions Based on Analysis of the Data 
# PEC description (from analysis section) 
1 
Inexperience increases the workload of a software startup team, contributing to the lack 
of resources typically associated with software startups 
2 
A lack of financial resources contributes towards a lack of resources in terms of person-
hours. 
3 
Only a small portion of the decisions (very) early stage software startups make requires 
experimentation over analytical decision-making based on existing good or best practices 
4 
A lack of financial resources notably increases the level of uncertainty experienced by a 
software startup 
5 
A lack of technical know-how in the team is a critical issue for software startups and 
increases the uncertainty experienced by a software startup 
6 Software startups do not operate in a predominantly chaotic environment 
 
We identified no chaos in the case startup (PEC6). This contradicts extant literature 
that has suggested that software startups operate in a chaotic environment in the context 
of Cynefin. One of the papers that originally suggested that startups operate in a chaotic 
environment dates back to 1998 [2]. While this may have been the case in 1998, we 
now understand startups better based on both practice and research. E.g., startups now 
have good practices to utilize and startup entrepreneurship is taught in universities.  
Indeed, software startups also do not seem to operate under as much uncertainty as 
is typically attributed to them. Only 15,4% of the decisions of Startup A were consid-
ered complex, and to thus involve notable levels of uncertainty, while the rest could be 
solved with good or best practices (PEC3). However, not all decisions are equal. Some 
decisions may have much larger impacts on the future of the firm than others. Moreo-
ver, the case startup was a very early stage one still working on the first version of its 
service. This may not be the case in more mature startups that have progressed further. 
Finally, chaotic situations are arguably possible in software startups (e.g. if a startup 
that has already been paying salaries runs out of funding), even if none were present in 
the case startup. However, software startups hardly seem characterized by chaos. 
In this study, most of the uncertainty experienced by Startup A stemmed from (1) 
lack capabilities in the team, and (2) lack of funding. Extant research has studied team 
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present from the start if they are required [9]. Our findings support this notion. How-
ever, problems related to securing technical know-how are not unique to startups2. 
The missing hardware capabilities quickly began to cause issues for Startup A as 
they struggled to validate their service idea, unable to develop an MVP. With no fund-
ing, they also found it difficult to experiment with hardware solutions. All in all, this 
resulted in an unreasonably long development cycle for an initial version of the product, 
which has been considered a key anti-pattern in software startups [4]. 
As for the lack of resources also experienced by Startup A, Klotins [3] recently ar-
gued that existing literature does not provide convincing arguments to support the 
uniqueness of startups in this regard. Our data does point towards software startups 
being unique in how they experience lack of resources (financial, person-hours). Lack-
ing funding, startup A had to devote notable amounts of resources towards securing 
some (PEC4), which, due to their small team size, resulted in less resources being avail-
able for productive activities, e.g. programming (PEC2). A mature business would not 
task its developers with writing funding applications while lacking financial resources.  
Finally, the inexperience of Startup A’s team contributed to their lack of resources 
(PEC1). With no entrepreneurship experience, they were forced to devote resources 
towards e.g. studying different legal company forms. An experienced founder and team 
will arguably devote less time towards such menial activities, letting the team devote 
more resources towards productive activities. This supports extant literature which has 
linked business and technical experience with success in software startups [12]. Our 
findings help us better understand why this is the case. 
6.1 Limitations of the Study 
The single case approach is a limitation to the generalizability of the results. However, 
even a single case study can be enough to form a theory and is especially appropriate 
for new topic areas [1]. We do not consider our results conclusive and encourage further 
studies in the area. Moreover, data for this study were collected from the business-
oriented founder, likely limiting the amount of SE-related decisions in the data. 
We also underline three limitations in the Cynefin framework: (1) it is a decision-
making framework for making sense of a situation rather than a categorizing tool for 
retrospective use as we have done here; (2) the subjective perception of an expert can 
make a complicated decision seem simple; and (3) the level of detail is important in 
categorization (e.g. deciding on applying funding vs. actually doing so). We have tack-
led the second limitation by conducting the analysis with three authors. 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have conducted a single, in-depth case study of a software startup in 
an ethnography-inspired fashion. Based on our results, we argue that software startups 
 
2 E.g., https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10669492 ("More than 10 000 open programmer positions, but no 
one to fill them").  
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are not characterized by a unique uncertainty, or chaos. The sources of uncertainty faced 
by the case startup (lack of financial resources and team capabilities, as well as idea 
validation) are issues any new or even mature business can face. However, a mature 
business might tackle these issues differently. 
To summarize our findings into practical implications, we underline the importance 
of: (i) understanding what capabilities are needed in the team, and aiming to secure 
them early on; and (ii) inexperienced software startup founders understanding the need 
to study various practical entrepreneurship skills (e.g. how to find a limited company). 
Finally, we encourage further research into what makes startups unique. Aside from 
uncertainty, various other characteristics have been attributed to software startups (see 
Introduction). Out of these characteristics, the uniqueness of startups in relation to fail-
ure rates, lack of (SE) experience, innovativeness, and (external/market) time pressure 
lack empirical support [3]. E.g. most startups fail, but so do most new firms [3]. 
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